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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
vious. The trend toward consideration of all of the circumstances
seems decidedly the more rational view.
J. A. KLmE EMIR, JR.
Parent and Child-Suit by Child Against Parent Carrying
Liability Insurance.
I An unemancipated minor sues her father to recover for injuries
alleged to have been sustained while riding in a school bus owned by
the father and operated by him under a contract with the school
board. The action is one of assumpsit and is based upon the theory
that the father breached his contract with the board to use due care
in transporting pupils. Both the father and the board carry liability
insurance. Held: A directed verdict for defendant reversed; plain-
tiff may maintain the action. Since the defendant is protected by
insurance in his vocational capacity, the action is not an unfriendly
one and family harmony will not be disrupted.'
Authorities are not in agreement as to the common law rule re-
garding suits by minors against their parents for torts.2  This un-
certainty arises from the fact that no case involving the point has
ever beei litigated in England. 3 The first decision in this country
appeared in 1891. 4 The problem has been before the courts several
times since that date. 5 With striking uniformity courts of the United
'Lusk v. Lusk, 166 S. E. 538 (W. Va. 1932). Noted in (1933) Dt=a
BAR Ass. J. 51.
2 Those who contend that such suits were not allowable rely on the total
absence of cases involving the point, as showing the general understanding
of minors' rights in this respect Furthermore, they say, the very idea of
such a recovery was repugnant to the sanctity and harmony of the English
family. Lo Galbo v. Lo Galbo, 138 Misc. Rep. 485, 246 N. Y. Supp. 565
(1931) ; Damiano v. Damiano, 143 Atl. 3 (N. J. 1928) ; Belleson v. Skilbeck,
185 Minn. 537, 242 N. W. 1 (1932). Others, quoting from old English text
writers to the effect that a minor could sue his father for a malicious injury,
assert that this demonstrates the state of the English mind with regard to
infants' rights. They also take the view that it is wholly unreasonable to as-
sume from a lack of decisions that the remedy would have been denied had
a proper case been presented. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Ati. 905
(1930), 71 A. L. R. 1055 (1931), citing 2 AiDisoN, ToRTs (4th ed.) 727;
CLM AND LiNDsALL, TORTS (8th ed.) 199; POLLOCK, TORTS (12th ed.) 128.
Note (1930) 79 U.-or PA. L. Rrv. 80.
I1 ScxouLmE, TnE LAw OF DomEsTic RmATioxs (6th ed. 1921) 718, n. 49;
Note (1923) 23 COL. L. Rxv. 686.4 Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), 13 L. R. A. 682
(1891) ; McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations (1929) 43
HARv. L. Ray. 1030, 1082.
5For a good review of the cases see Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118
S. E. 12 (1923), 31 A. L. L 1135 (1924). Note (1923) 30 COL. L. REV. 686;
(1929) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030 (a most careful and comprehensive study of
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States have denied recovery. The application of the rule has been
so rigid that recovery is denied in the case of malicious and excessive
punishment0 and even in the case of the rape by a father of his
daughter. 7 Inroads have been made into the rule denying recovery,8
however, in the case of a minor, but emancipated child;9 of suits
the subject). The most recent cases are Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1,
163 S. E. 708 (1932) ; Belleson v. Skilbeck, supra note 2.
'Smith v. Smith; 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N. E. 128 (1924).
" Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905), 68 L. R. A. 893 (1905).
'Perhaps it would be wise to make a fourth category on the basis of the
two forceful dissents in Small v. Morrison, supra note 5, and in Wick v.
Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787 (1927), 52 A. L. R. 1113 (1928). In the
latter case Crownhart, J., points out that the constitution of Wisconsin, art. 1,
§9, provides for the relief of any person for injuries to his property, person,
or character. He says, at 788, that no court at common law ever said an
infant was without a remedy in the case of an injury due to the parent's neg-
ligence. "Indeed there is no doubt that the infant may sue the parent to
preserve his property rights. The court flow declares a public policy which
forbids an infant for suing for wrongs inflicted upon the infant by the parent.
But courts may not make public policy contrary to the organic law of the
land. The constitutional provision is as broad and comprehensive as the Eng-
lish language is capable of expressing." The dissent of Clark, C. J., in the
Small case includes the rationale of the Lusk case, and in addition, persuasively
urges that neither common law nor statutes deny the child a right to sue his
parent in tort. See infra note 11.
A case in point was recently decided under the civil law of Quebec. Fi-
delity & Casualty Co. v. Marchand, [1924] (Can.) S. C. R. 86, 13 R. R. C. 1135.
The plaintiff (Marchand) had injured his infant son by the negligent opera-
tion of his. automobile. The father, having insurance, got the son to institute
a suit for damages, and a judgment having been recovered, the father paid
it without resorting to an appeal or without giving the insurance company
time in which to do so. The case cited is the father's suit against the in-
surance company to recover the amount of the judgment he had been "forced"
to pay his son. The court held that this payment before appeal was in clear
violation of the terms of the policy and denied recovery. The court, how-
ever, by way of dicta approved the son's recovery from his father, saying
that it seemed to be a proper ruling under art. 1053 of the civil code. Mignault,
J., said, at 1146, that the rule of the code "is in as wide terms as possible and
renders every person capable of distinguishing right from wrong responsible
for damage caused'by his fault to another. There is here no limitation, no
exception of persons, and the class of those to whom compensation is due
is as wide as that of the persons on whom liability is imposed. It seems there-
fore sufficient to say lex non distinguit, however repugnant it may seem that
a minor child should sue his own father, although it would probably be equally
repugnant that a child injured by his father's negligent act, perhaps maimed
for life, should have no redress for the damage suffered."
'Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N. W. 763 (1908), sanctions the
rule that an emancipated minor may sue his parent, but the case was re-
manded to determine whether in point of fact the plaintiff had been emanci-
pated or not. In Lo Galbo v. Lo Galbo, supra note 2, the court held that a
widow may maintain an action for damages for the death of her husband,
the defendant's father, since the father himself could have maintained a suit
for his injuries had they not proved fatal. The court says in effect that the
reverse of this would also be true--that a suit by an emancipated minor
would have been allowed.
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against one in loco parentis;'0 and in negligence cases where the
parent has insurance."
The reasons most frequently relied upon in support of the rule
denying recovery are: (1) "public policy" (i.e., the policy of seeking
to preserve family unity and harmony);12 (2) the supposed com-
mon law authority for the rule;13 (3) the availability of a remedy
"- Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901) (suit
against stepmother for grave and permanent injuries, the result of chastise-
ment) ; Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640 (1903) (suit against an
aunt, with whom plaintiff resided, for damages because of improper care,
and severe and brutal whippings) ; Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N. W.
173 (1925) (suit for damages for injuries caused by severe whippings ad-
ministered by one in whose care the plaintiff was left for the summer).
"The case of Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 2, is not as strong as the in-
stant case. The defendant father employed his infant son during the sum-
mer. He, the father, carried employer's liability insurance, the premiums of
which were computed at an agreed percentage of the pay roll. The defendant
furnished a list of the employees, and the amounts of their pay, from time
to time, including the plaintiff's name. The agent of the insurance company
knew the relationship existing between the parties. The court, in sum-
marizing its opinion, said, at 195: "It [parental immunity from infant's suits]
is imposed for the protection of family control and harmony, and exists
only where a suit or the prospect of a suit might disturb the family rela-
tions. . . . It does not apply to an emancipated child, or to a case where
liability in fact has been transferred to a third party." Cf. supra note 8 re-
garding the dissent of Clark, C. J., in Small v. Morrison.
Stacy, J., in writing the majority opinion in Small v. Morrison, supra
note 5, said, 185 N. C. at 584, 118 S. E. at 15: "From the very beginning
the family in its integrity has been the foundation of American institutions,
and we are not now disposed to depart from this basic principle. . . . Hence
in a democracy or a polity like ours, the government of a well ordered
home is one of the surest bulwarks against the forces that make for social
disorder and civic decay. It is the very cradle of civilization, with the future
welfare of the commonwealth dependent, in a large measure, upon the efficacy
and success of its administration." In Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. I. 131,
131 Atl. 198 (1925), 42 A. L. R. 1360 (1926), the court said, at 199: "Any-
thing that brings the child into conflict with the father or diminishes the
father's authority or hampers him in its exercise is repugnant to the family
establishment and is not to be countenanced save in positive provisions of
the statute law. Any proceeding tending to bring discord into the family
and disorganize its government may well be regarded as contrary to the com-
mon law and not to be sanctioned by the courts. Such conflict would arise
by recognizing the right of a minor child to bring an action against the fa-
ther to recover damages for torts alleged to have been committed by the
father in the course of the family relation, and resulting in personal injury
to the child."
" Supra note 2. As indicated, the existence of a rule at common law
denying a recovery by the infant is problematical. Those who believe in its
existence give as the rule's basis: (1) policy; (2) the analogy of the in-
ability of a husband or wife to sue the other at common law. But this analogy
is not a true one for the reason that in theory the two spouses were identical.
Such was not true, however, of the relationship which existed between the
father and child.
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under the criminal law.14 The strongest and most frequently em-
ployed argument is the one of policy.15  In practically all cases in
which the defendant has had insurance such element has been lightly
brushed aside as a wholly irrelevant consideration,16 but under the
present decision it has been treated as one of decided importance.
Strictly viewed, the holding of the present case extends only to a
situation where the parent is protected by insurance in his vocational
capacity, but the court's rejection of refined distinctions suggests
that it would sanction other suits where the defendant has insurance
covering liability outside his vocational sphere. 17 It appears quite
clear that the case does not go beyond this point; to do so would in-
fringe upon the holding of the same court in Securo v. Securo' s
(denying the child's cause of action where the parent himself has to
pay the judgment), a result the West Virginia court did not intend.19
Inasmuch as the policy which is the core of the rule denying recovery
when child sues parent is dissolved by the element of insurance, it
appears that the court, in allowing the action to be maintained, has
reached a result that is as logical as it is laudable.
WILSON BARBER.
Public Utilities--Regulation of Private Contract Carriers.
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court' marks the
successful culmination of a long series of efforts on the part of the
" In Hewlett v. George, supra note 4, the court said, 9 So. at 887, 13
L. R. A. at 684: "The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor
child protection from personal violence and wrongdoing, and this is all the
child can be heard to demand." Matarese v. Matarese, supra note 12, at 199.
" One of the most celebrated and widely commented upon cases is that
of Wick v. Wick, supra note 8, and it contains an excellent statement of the
policy argument. Cf. supra note 12. Note (1926) 1 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 209;
Note (1926) 11 MARQuTFrE L. REv. 164.
" Small v. Morrison, supra note 5; Ledgerwood v. Ledgerwood, 114 Cal.
App. 538, 300 Pac. 144 (1931). The suit was by a mother against her infant
son, the court saying the presence of insurance is irrelevant. The rule would
have been the same had the parties been reversed.
2'The court speaking through Hatcher, J., said, at 539: "When no need
exists for parental immunity, the courts should not extend it as a mere
gratuity. Without such an extension, nothing stands in the way of this
action. It is familiar law that a child may bring to account the parent for
wrongful disposition of the child's own property. It must not be said the
courts are more considerate of the property of the child than of its person(when unaffected by the family relationship)."110 W. Va. 1, 156 S. E. 750 (1931).
In the Lusk case the court said, at 539: "They (counsel for plaintiff]
recognize that Securo v. Securo opposes a recovery from the father. But
they would differentiate this case ... " The distinction was allowed by the
court.
'Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct. 181, 77 L. ed. 203 (1932).
